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THE FUTILE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE
MEDIA IN SYMBOLIC SPEECH CASES
William E. Lee*
In 1966, David O'Brien stood on the steps of the South Boston
Courthouse and burned his draft card to communicate his opposition to the draft and the Vietnam War. A central part of the government's argument against him in United States v. O'Brien 1 was
that alternative means of communication were available for the expression of dissent.2 Although the Supreme Court did not address
the question of alternatives, the decision attached minimal significance to the medium. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion addressed the question, concluding that O'Brien "could have
conveyed his message in many other ways than by burning his draft
card."3 In the 1980s the Supreme Court made the existence of alternative means of communication part of its analysis in contentneutral symbolic speech cases.4
In cases where the medium is the message, any inquiry into
alternatives rests on the false perception that messages can be surgically separated from their media.s Alternative means of communi• Professor, Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Georgia. Copyright© 1991, William E. Lee.
I. 391 u.s. 367 (1968).
2. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
3. 391 U.S. at 389 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (noting the similarity between the O'Brien test for content neutral regulations and the time, place
and manner test, and applying a hybrid test). For criticism of the hybrid O'Brien time, place
and manner test in settings other than symbolic speech cases, see David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 195
(1987).
5. The premise that laws affecting media do not affect messages is a fundamental aspect of the Court's time, place and manner doctrine. See generally William E. Lee, Lonely
Pamphleteers, Little People and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner
Regulations of Expression, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 757 (1986). Although a prohibition of a
medium may be facially content-neutral, it could have a discriminatory impact on certain
messages. See id. at 764-71.
Some commentators have recently suggested a heightened role for assessment of the
suitability of alternative means of communication. SeeR. George Wright, The Unnecessary
Complexity of Free Speech Low and the Centro/ Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9
Pace L. Rev. 57 (1989); Note, Motivation Analysis in Light of Renton, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 344
(1987). While some aspects of alternative media, such as cost, are readily compared, this
article argues that symbolic media involve factors, such as ability to convey emotion, that
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cation, such as words, often lack the communicative power of
symbolic actions such as flag burning. Additionally, the theoretical
availability of alternative media is of little value to those who lack
the skill or resources to use those media.
This article advocates that the Court disregard the existence of
alternative channels of communication when assessing content-neutral prohibitions of symbolic media. This change would require the
Court to treat the prohibition of a symbolic medium as a serious
restriction on communicative opportunities rather than as a slight
burden. The argument here is not that all methods of symbolic
communication are protected. Rather, the argument is that the
Court should recognize the importance individuals attach to the selection of a method of expression. First amendment doctrine
should presume that individuals know best both what to communicate and how to communicate it.
To ask merely whether alternatives exist accomplishes nothing,
because the answer will always be yes unless the government has
banned all methods of communication. To ask whether the alternatives are "adequate" opens an inquiry into the capacity of various
media to convey emotion and other highly nuanced and elusive aspects of symbolic speech. The Court has addressed similar issues in
the context of words: some of the Court's answers provide a useful
perspective for symbolic speech cases, and some answers reveal the
difficulty of even posing the question of alternatives.
In Cohen v. California 6 the Court overturned a conviction for
the use of a particular word to express opposition to the draft. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, understood the communicative
importance of certain words. He wrote, "(W]e cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. "7
Even though other words could be used to convey what Justice
Harlan called "cognitive content," a particular word may be unique
make comparison of alternative media exceptionally difficult. In symbolic speech cases, inquiries into the suitability of alternative media will be highly arbitrary and most likely will
depend largely on judgments about whether use of a particular form of expression should be
protected.
6. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
7. Id. at 26. Professor White believes that certain words "do not operate in ordinary
speech as restatable concepts but as words with a life and force of their own. They cmnot be
replaced with definitions ... for they constitute unique resources, of mixed fact and value,
and their translation into other terms would destroy their nature." James Boyd White, When
Words Lose Their Meaning II (U. Chi. Press, 1984).
In other settings, Justice Harlan was quite comfortable with the examination of the
availability of alternative media. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); NLRB v. Fruit cf Vegetable Packers cf Warehousemen, Local
760, 377 U.S. 58, 93 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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in conveying "otherwise inexpressible emotions . . which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the
overall message sought to be communicated."s The advantage of
Justice Harlan's view is that it avoids the intractable assessment of
the suitability of alternatives. Surely the judiciary is ill-equipped to
inquire into both the cognitive and emotive nuances of words. By
treating a communicator's selection of the form of expression and
the message equally, Justice Harlan's approach places the issues in a
speech protective framework.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 9 the Court upheld restrictions
on indecent broadcast speech. Justice Stevens's majority opinion
claimed that the regulation would affect "the form, rather than the
content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts
that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." 10
Justice Stevens' approach will never protect speech because it allows the Court to treat the burden on expression as slight. Also, it
allows the Court to disregard the link between the medium and the
message. Justice Brennan's dissent, though, reflected the perspective stated in Cohen. He believed that words cannot be readily separated from ideas and that "[a] given word may have a unique
capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an
image."11
The looseness of defining "adequate" alternatives is shown in
8. 403 U.S. at 26. See also Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286 (1952) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("Emotions sway speakers and audiences alike."). Linguists distinguish between the symbolic and emotive use of words. Professors Ogden and Richards wrote: "The
symbolic use of words is statement; the recording, the support, the organization and communication of references. The emotive use of words is a more simple matter, it is the use of
words to express or excite feelings and attitudes." Charles Kay Ogden & Ivor Armstrong
Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 149 (Harcourt, Brace, & Co., lOth ed. 1949). They acknowledge that both functions are subtly interwoven. ld. at 150.
9. 438 u.s. 726 (1978).
10. /d. at 743 n.l8. The broadcast in Pacifica was George Carlin's "Seven Dirty
Words" in which the comedian used indecent language to satirize contemporary attitudes
about certain words. It is difficult to conceive how Carlin could have made his point without
using the offensive words. Professor Quadres notes that Carlin's monologue is "one of the
best examples of ... form and message, totally merged." Harold Quadres, The Applicability
of Content-Based Time. Place. and Manner Regulations to Offensive Language: The Burger
Decade, 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 995, 1037 (1981).
II. 438 U.S. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Brennan recently described boycotts as a special form of communication because of the ability to
convey unique emotional messages. He wrote,
The passive nonviolence of King and Gandhi are proof that the resolute acceptance
of pain may communicate dedication and righteousness more eloquently than mere
words ever could. A boycott, like a hunger stoke, conveys an emotional message
that is absent in a letter-to-the-editor, a conversation with the mayor, or even a
protest march.
FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 789-90 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,12 where the Court upheld a permanent injunction prohibiting the petitioner from describing an athletic competition and
related events as the "Gay Olympics." To the Court, the restrictions on "Olympic" merely affected a manner of communication
and not a message.t3 The Ninth Circuit found that the SFAA had
"satisfactory" alternative means of communication, although it did
not present any analysis of the substitutes. 14 The Court merely
noted that the SFAA held its athletic event under the name "Gay
Games," evidently assuming that the substitute was adequate.1s
But Judge Kozinski and Justice Brennan regarded the availability
of alternatives as irrelevant. Judge Kozinski wrote in dissent: "To
say that the SFAA could have named its event 'The Best and Most
Accomplished Amateur Gay Athletes Competition' no more answers the first amendment concerns here than to suggest that Paul
Robert Cohen could have worn a jacket saying 'I Strongly Resent
the Draft.' "16 Justice Brennan's dissent stated that translations
never fully capture the sense of the original and that the first
amendment protects more than the right to a mere translation.11
SFAA and Pacifica should be viewed in context: the former is a
commercial speech case and the latter involved broadcasting. The
Court regards first amendment interests in both settings to be reduced. Both cases can easily be set aside as precedents for cases
where the symbolic speech addresses political issues, a subject matter the Court regards as at the core of first amendment protection.1s
Cohen, therefore, sets the appropriate framework for symbolic
speech cases involving political speech. Cohen raises a provocative
question for symbolic speech: if prohibition of a particular word
12. 483 u.s. 522 (1987).
13. Id. at 536.
14. Int. Olympic Com. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 737, reb. den.
789 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit stated, "Because SFAA bad satisfactory
alternative means for expressing its opposition to the Olympics, it bas no First Amendment
right to use 'Olympics' or the Olympic symbols to promote its games or products." ld. The
mere assertion of the availability of alternatives is common in symbolic speech cases. See,
e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. II II, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (message could have
been conveyed in many ways other than burning the flag).
15. 483 U.S. at 536.
16. 789 F.2d at 1321 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
17. 483 U.S. at 569-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the first amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental atfairs). Of course, the first amendment's protection is not limited to political speech. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical
matters is not entitled to full first amendment protection). The point is that cases such as
O'Brien raise considerations wholly apart from those in cases such as SFAA and Pacifica.
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creates the risk of suppressing an idea, does not a prohibition of a
particular symbolic behavior also create the risk of suppressing an
idea?
In symbolic speech cases where the Court finds that the government is regulating content, the availability of alternatives is
either not discussed-and by implication considered to be insufficient to justify the restriction 19-or it is explicitly rejected as a justification of the law.2o Under either approach, the result is the same;
the Court does not allow the possibility of alternative media to alter
the presumed invalidity of content-based regulations.
Texas v. Johnson 21 illustrates the Court's approach to the ques. tion of alternative media in the context of content-based restrictions. The state claimed that the ftag was a unique symbol and that
the statute was necessary to prevent dilution of the flag's symbolic
value,22 but also asserted that alternative means of communication
remained open for political dissent.23 The respondent claimed that
the statute selectively relegated to other media only those who express viewpoints in opposition to the state's view of the ftag.2• Justice Brennan noted that the Court's hostility to content regulation
"is not dependent upon the particular mode in which one chooses to
express an idea."2s Further, the availability of alternative means of
communication was insufficient to justify the law.26
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the ftag as
a unique symbol27 but nonetheless claimed that flag burning "conveyed nothing that could not have been conveyed and was not conveyed just as forcefully in a dozen different ways. "2s The Chief
Justice's claim, like that of the state, contradicts itself because if the
flag is unique, then by definition other forms of communication cannot be as "forceful" as flag burning. Granted, Johnson was free to
19. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(prohibition on armbands was designed to suppress views opposing American involvement in
Vietnam).
20. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (rejecting state court's
claim that the inhibition on expression was minuscule because many alternative media could
be used).
21. 491 u.s. 397 (1989).
22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Brief for Petitioner at 20, 27).
23. Id. at 40.
24. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (Brief for Respondent at 13 n.l4).
25. 491 U.S. at 416. To the majority, the case was similar to Schact v. United States,
398 U.S. 58 (1970) where the Court invalidated a federal statute that permitted actors to wear
military uniforms only if the portrayal did not discredit the armed forces.
26. 491 U.S. at 416 n.ll.
27. ld. at 422 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). President Bush, who favored a constitutional amendment to protect the flag, continually emphasized the flag's uniqueness. See, e.g.,
26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 938 (June 12, 1990).
28. 491 U.S. at 431.
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use verbal slogans, but Chief Justice Rehnquist offered no standards
or guidelines to explain how he concluded that such slogans conveyed Johnson's message-both the cognitive and the emotional29-as forcefully as flag burning. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
perception of flag burning as an "inarticulate grunt" that was "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas"3o is more accurately seen
as reflecting his belief that the flag should have special protection
than as an assessment of the communicative forcefulness of flag
burning.
Both the United States and the appellees in United States v.
Eichman 3t agreed that the flag was unique. The United States argued that the importance of preserving the flag's symbolism warranted placing flag burning outside the protection of the first
amendment. This would not harm freedom of expression because
alternative means of expression, such as words, remained available.32 To the appellees, however, the flag's symbolic significance
made the impropriety of restricting its use even more apparent.33
Flag burning was regarded as an "indispensable" means of rejecting
forced patriotism,34 and as a way of leaping across language barriers
to indict the government internationally for its oppression.3s
The Court rejected the government's invitation to reconsider
flag burning as fully protected expression and consequently did not
address the relevance of the availability of alternative means of expression. In dissent, however, Justice Stevens suggested that
prohibitions on certain methods of communication were justified if
( 1) supported by a interest unrelated to suppression of specific ideas;
(2) the speaker could use other means to express those ideas; and (3)
the speaker's interest in using a particular means of communication
was less important than the interest supporting the prohibition.36
The first point concerns facial viewpoint neutrality, a factor Justice
Stevens finds highly significant.37 While the Flag Protection Act of
29. In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), he acknowledged the "deep emotional
feelings" the flag arouses. ld. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. 491 U.S. at 431-32.
31. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
32. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Brief for the United States at 45).
At oral argument the government claimed that robust, uninhibited debate was unimpeded.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (Transcript of Oral Argument at 48).
33. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (Brief for Appellee Strong at 31-32).
34. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (Joint Appendix at 53) (declaration of David Blalock).
35. Id. at 47-48 (declaration of Shawn Eichman).
36. 110 S. Ct. at 2410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. See e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 438 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that
flag statute does not facially single out particular viewpoints); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 86 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (zoning ordinance is viewpoint neutral).
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19893s did not single out viewpoints such as opposition to racial
discrimination, it punished acts associated with disrespect for the
ftag and one's view of the ftag is a viewpoint.39 The second and
third inquiries are more relevant to the purpose of this article. The
second inquiry accomplishes nothing: as noted above, unless all
other forms of expression have been banned, there will always be
alternatives. To ask whether the alternatives are adequate is not a
satisfactory question either. Both the definition and identification
of adequacy are value laden and question begging. Adequacy can
be defined according to hidden or underlying principles. For example, if one believes that the first amendment protects messages to a
greater extent than it protects the choice of a medium, 40 another
medium will be adequate even though the communicator must sacrifice some intensity or communicative impact. Even if one believes
that the alternatives must not result in diminished communicative
impact, 41 the comparison of the communicative impact of various
forms of speech is a highly elusive task.42 Justice Stevens proposed
no definition of adequacy, nor did he elaborate the factors to be
studied when determining adequacy.43
Justice Stevens admitted that critical inquiry was really the
third point: a balance of the individual's interest in using the ftag
against the importance of the symbol. This inquiry, however, is
38.

Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777, codified at 18
§ 700 (1989).
39. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 413 n.9. One of the reasons the Eichman appellees burned
flags was to protest "forced patriotism." Joint Appendix at 53 (declaration of David
Blalock).
40. a. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (people do not have a constitutional right to speak whenever and however and wherever they please); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (the rights of free speech and assembly do not mean that everyone with
opinions to express may address a group at any public place and at any time).
41. But see Irving R. Kaufmann, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment,
45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 773 (1970) ("[a]ll media cannot convey all messages with equal
force").
42. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. Rev. 964 (1978). Professor Baker is also critical of the absence of criteria for measuring
the adequacy of different forms of expression. He adds,
Judges (as arms of the state), particularly given that judges are drawn almost exclusively from the dominant classes in society, will normally find that the dissidents
have had adequate opportunity and that they have lost in the debate because their
position is unpersuasive. In other words, state determination of adequacy will usually favor the status quo.
ld. at 987.
43. Justice Stevens acknowledged that some media may be less effective in drawing
attention, 110 S. Ct. at 2411 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but this does not address all of the
reasons why communicators select a particular medium. For a discussion of factors motivating selection of a form of symbolic speech, see Howard M. Friedman, Why Do You Speak
That Way? Symbolic Speech Reconsidered, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 587 (1988).

u.s.c.
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heavily dependent upon one's view of the usefulness of alternatives.
Consider the following statements:
A) There are many alternatives to flag burning; thus when the
individual interest succumbs to the government's interest, free
speech is insignificantly burdened.
B) Flag burning is a unique form of expression; thus when the
individual interest succumbs to the government's interest, free
speech is significantly burdened.

By presuming there were many alternatives, Justice Stevens framed
the issues in a manner that easily allowed vindication of the government's interest. As noted earlier, his presumption about alternatives is flawed: if the flag is unique, then by definition there is no
alternative means of expressing the message of flag burning. Recognizing the communicative importance of flag burning does not necessarily require a result in favor of the individual. The Court could
still find the governmental interest to be sufficiently important to
justify the admittedly serious impact on free expression. But to do
so, the fit between the law's means and end must withstand exacting
scrutiny.
In its O'Brien brief, the United States claimed that draft card
burning was not an "essential" means for disseminating a viewpoint
because an array of alternative modes of expressing opposition to
the Vietnam war existed.44 At oral argument, the Solicitor General
again claimed that adequate alternatives existed: "O'Brien was free,
at all times, to express dissent by speech from the courthouse steps,
or on the street corners, by letters to the editor, by pamphlet, by
radio and television."4s The Court did not expressly address the
question of the availability of alternatives, but Justice Harlan wrote
in a concurring opinion that the case would be altogether different if
there were no other way for O'Brien to convey his message.46 Jus44. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Brief for the United States at 8). See
also United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1966) (law prohibiting destruction of
draft cards does not prevent political dissent through other means of communication).
45. Transcript of Oral Argument 10, in Phillip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, 65
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the United States Supreme Court 908, 917 (University
Pub., 1975).
46. 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). Professor Tribe regards the initial burden of proof of the inadequacy of alternatives as resting upon the speaker. Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 983 (Foundation, 2d ed. 1988). Professor Redish disagrees with this, stating that an inquiry into adequate media should occur only after the state
has established a compelling interest for its regulation. Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 149 n.209 (1981). After a compelling interest is established, Redish would require that the speaker prove that alternative
media are inadequate. ld. at 149. Redish does note, however, that the inquiry into alternative media poses first amendment difficulties: "why is it an appropriate task for ... the
Supreme Court to decide for Mr. O'Brien what increases or decreases the intensity of his
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tice Harlan's opinion lacked an explanation of how he concluded
that the alternatives conveyed the same message as draft card
burning.
What if the O'Brien Court had evaluated the adequacy of alternative forms of expression? O'Brien told the jury that he burned his
draft card because he considered the draft system "intrinsically immoral, wrong, a system that sustains death rather than life."47 If
O'Brien had stood on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse and
uttered those words, would they convey the intensity of his feelings
about the draft in a manner that could be identified as "adequate"
in comparison to the burning of his draft card? It is one thing to
measure readily identifiable factors such as the expense of various
media; it is quite another for a court to compare the cognitive and
emotional impact of different media. Comparing a form of symbolic speech with other communicative modes involves elusive questions of nuance and communicative impact that ultimately depend
on question-begging assessments of the activity's first amendment
status.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence•s also illustrates the difficulty of defining and identifying adequate alternatives.
CCNV was permitted to erect a symbolic tent city to protest the
plight of the homeless, but participants were not allowed to sleep in
the tents. In its application for a Park Service permit, CCNV explained that the demonstration would allow the homeless to "communicate their humanity, their need, and their plight to the
government and to the public, in the only real way open to them."49
At the Supreme Court, CCNV explained that many homeless lack
the resources and skills necessary to communicate their ideas
through verbal expression.so The United States claimed that by itself, sleep would communicate only that the people were sleepy.
Because the public would not understand the protester's message
without an explanation through other media, sleep barely added to
that message.s1 Justice White found that the regulation prohibiting
message? Is not this very inquiry an invasion of first amendment freedom?" Id. at 148-49
(notes omitted).
47. United States P. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Joint Appendix at 29).
48. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
49. Clark P. Community for CreatiPe Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (Joint Appendix at 14).
SO. Brief for Respondents at 22. At oral argument counsel for respondents stated, "The
First Amendment, were it confined solely to verbal activity, were it confined solely to the
classic means of expression, would be a means of communication that was open to the comfortable and the highly educated." Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Clark v. Community
for Creatipe Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
51. Brief for Petitioners at 13-14. A similar claim was made during oral argument of
Eichman when the government claimed that flag burning left a major "message gap" that had
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camping in certain parks left the symbolic city intact with signs and
the presence of those willing to take part in a day-and-night vigil.
Thus, the regulation could not be faulted on the ground that the
plight of the homeless could not be communicated in ways other
than sleep.s2 By merely pointing to alternatives, Justice White implicitly found them to be adequate.
Justice White perceived the primary purpose of sleep as
"facilitative."s3 Justice Marshall in dissent characterized the primary purpose of sleep in symbolic terms. Sleeping portrayed the
neglect from which the homeless suffer "with an articulateness even
Dickens could not match."S4 Although Justice Marshall agreed
with the majority that the appropriate test was one in which the
adequacy of alternatives was measured, he did not reach this prong
of the inquiry because he felt the government had failed to justify
the restriction.ss But his perception of the symbolic importance of
sleep affected the intensity of his scrutiny of the government's interests. In contrast, the majority discounted sleep's symbolic importance and was thus able to treat the ban like a mere restriction on
the demonstration's physical attributes, such as its size. But a prohibition of a medium raises different problems from regulations affecting where, when, and how speakers may use that medium.
Banning sleeping as a manner of expression is distinct from limiting
the number of participants in a sleep-in because the latter preserves
the communicator's autonomy in selecting the medium of
expression. 56
Symbolic speech is of critical importance to those "puny anonymities"s7 who attract attention to their ideas through the most
to be filled in with words. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 ( 1990) (Transcript of
Oral Argument at 5-7). Some Justices disagreed with this assessment of flag burning. Id. at
8. See also text accompanying note 35.
52. 468 U.S. at 295.
53. Id. at 296. The organizers of the demonstration had experience with previous demonstrations involving the homeless and claimed that unless the homeless had a "survivalrelated reason" for being in the park, they would not participate. Joint Appendix at 14. To
the extent that the ban would limit the nature, extent, and duration of the demonstration, the
Court believed that it would lessen the impact on the parks. 468 U.S. at 296. Justice Marshall argued that the facilitative purpose of sleeping took nothing away from its status as
symbolic expression. Id. at 310 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. 468 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting CCNVv. Watt, 703 F.2d 586,601
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
55. Id. at 308-12.
56. Lee, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 805 n.30l (cited in note 5). I have previously commented on the ambiguity of the term "manner." Id. at 757 n.2. In the symbolic speech
context, it is critical for the Court to distinguish between regulations affecting the physical
attributes of a manner of expression and total prohibitions of that manner of expression.
57. The phrase originates with Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
629 ( 1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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powerful communicative resource available to them, their symbolic
behavior. The Court should recognize that for some communicators and messages, there is no other medium. Additionally, the
Court should recognize that a prohibition of a symbolic medium
may have a disproportionate impact on certain messages.
When the Court understates the importance of a particular medium, as occurred in O'Brien and Clark, cursory scrutiny of the law
occurs.5s Consider the consequences of disregarding alternatives in
symbolic speech cases. This would avoid the intractable problems
posed by judicial definition of the "adequacy" of alternatives. More
importantly, disregarding alternatives casts the burden on expression in a different light. To facilitate important first amendment
values such as self-fulfillment and the participation of poorly-financed citizens, the Court should acknowledge the importance of
an individual's choice of how to communicate. The Court's symbolic speech methodology should disregard the fact that alternatives-which are always available in theory-exist.

58. The Clark Court barely scrutinized whether the prohibition advanced the governmental interest and rejected the view that less restrictive measures were available. 468 U.S. at
299. Justice White concluded that camping would be contrary to the government's interest in
maintaining the parks, yet this overlooks that the government allowed the demonstrators to
erect tents and feign sleep and that there was no proof that actual sleep caused additional
damage. On the issue of the narrowness of the prohibition, the Court was satisfied that the
prohibition did not exceed its purpose (id. at 297), and stated that the judiciary is not endowed with "competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that
level of conservation is to be attained." ld. at 299. The O'Brien Court gave very generous
treatment to the government's interests; commentators describe the governmental interests in
O'Brien as insubstantial. See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. I, 23. The draft card destruction law was
seriously defective because a law prohibiting nonpossession, which could occur for noncommunicative purposes, was not enforced while the law against destruction was enforced only
against those who publicly burned their cards.

